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Spontaneous first impressions 
emerge from brief training
Ruth Lee1,3*, Jonathan C. Flavell1, Steven P. Tipper1, Richard Cook1,2 & Harriet Over1
People have a strong and reliable tendency to infer the character traits of strangers based solely on 
facial appearance. In five highly powered and pre-registered experiments, we investigate the relative 
merits of learning and nativist accounts of the origins of these first impressions. First, we test whether 
brief periods of training can establish consistent first impressions de novo. Using a novel paradigm 
with Greebles—a class of synthetic object with inter-exemplar variation that approximates that seen 
between individual faces—we show that participants quickly learn to associate appearance cues with 
trustworthiness (Experiments 1 and 2). In a further experiment, we show that participants easily learn 
a two-dimensional structure in which individuals are presented as simultaneously varying in both 
trustworthiness and competence (Experiment 3). Crucially, in the final two experiments (Experiments 
4 and 5) we show that, once learned, these first impressions occur following very brief exposure 
(100 ms). These results demonstrate that first impressions can be rapidly learned and, once learned, 
take on features previously thought to hold only for innate first impressions (rapid availability). Taken 
together, these results highlight the plausibility of learning accounts of first impressions.
Upon meeting a stranger, observers quickly draw inferences about their apparent trustworthiness, honesty, 
competence and  intelligence1–3. These first impressions appear to exert a powerful influence over behaviour and 
can result in systematic  bias4–6. The behavioural consequences of these trait inferences are particularly troubling 
because while some first impressions appear to be  veridical7–9, many others bear little or no resemblance to the 
actual character traits of the individuals being  judged10,11.
The inferences that we make about traits from faces are often argued to be partly a product of innate cogni-
tive architecture specialized for first impressions. According to this theoretical position, distinguishing friends 
from foe and leaders from followers was so crucial to the survival of our species that we evolved mechanisms 
for making spontaneous judgments from others’  appearance12–15.
According to an influential alternative framework, Trait Inference Mapping (TIM), first impressions are 
largely products of learned associations between points in face space and trait  space16,17 These mappings allow 
excitation to spread automatically from perceptual descriptions of face shape to representations of particular trait 
profiles. Exposure to consistent depictions of “good guys” and “bad guys”, “leaders” and “followers” in illustrated 
storybooks, film, television, ritual, art, and  iconography18–21 may lead different individuals within a society to 
acquire similar face–trait mappings—so-called consensus impressions. Other, more ‘idiosyncratic’ mappings 
may be acquired as a result of direct social interactions with  others12,22–26.
Proponents of both theoretical positions agree that at least some first impressions are  learned12,16,27–34. Evi-
dence in favour of this claim comes from data showing that participants form first impressions from cultural 
cues. For example, children and adults from Western cultures typically judge individuals who wear glasses to 
be more intelligent than individuals who do not wear  glasses35. As glasses are an invention of relatively recent 
human history, these first impressions cannot be the result of gene-based natural  selection16. Consistent with at 
least some role for learning, other research has shown that there appear to be systematic cultural differences in 
first impressions from  appearance17 and that it is possible to modify pre-existing first impressions of faces with 
 training28,36. More recently, a twin study confirmed that individual differences in first impressions are driven 
mostly by the  environment12.
Nativist accounts hold that where first impressions are innate they can be recognized by three features. Innate 
first impressions (1) emerge early in development, (2) show broad cross-cultural similarity and (3) are acces-
sible following very rapid presentation of  stimuli12–15,22,37. In relation to the latter, evidence that observers form 
consistent first impressions even when faces are presented for as little as 100 ms has been taken as evidence that 
they are likely to be innately  specified3,13.
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According to TIM, on the other hand, mappings between face space and trait space are the products of 
 learning16. TIM predicts that adults will be able to learn first impressions from relatively brief experience. Rather 
than requiring protracted social experience over several years, learning and generalisation may occur with brief 
training. Furthermore, once learned, these first impressions will become rapidly available. That is, first impres-
sions acquired through learning will quickly take on qualities previously assumed to apply specifically to map-
pings based on innate architecture.
The study of appearance-trait learning in the lab is not straightforward. One approach is to attempt to modify 
existing patterns of face-trait mappings by providing participants with novel face-trait  experience23,28,29. For exam-
ple, having learned that a particular individual is untrustworthy or trustworthy, participants are less likely to trust 
people who resemble that person in future  interactions28,36. However, the learning required to modify a mature 
set of mappings and that required to establish mappings de novo may differ in important respects. Participants 
arrive with firm preconceptions about the relationship between facial appearance and  traits37,38. Lab-based face-
trait experience that violates those expectations may be surprising and thereby exert a disproportionate influence 
on  learning39,40. There is also some indication that new learning that contradicts a previously-learned rule tends 
to manifest only in specific  contexts41,42. Most importantly in this context, it is not possible to use this type of 
paradigm to determine whether first impressions acquired purely through learning can become rapidly available.
In the present paper, we seek to develop a second, complementary approach to the study of appearance-trait 
learning, whereby a novel stimulus category is used as a proxy for faces. By presenting participants with novel 
stimuli, with which they have had no previous experience, researchers can examine how trait inferences emerge 
de novo as a function of correlated appearance-trait experience. We illustrate this approach using  Greebles43,44. 
Greebles are a class of synthetic object developed to study the emergence of perceptual expertise. Every Greeble 
has a vertical central part and four protruding parts. The variation between Greeble exemplars broadly replicates 
that seen between individual faces. Thus, Greebles can be categorised into two ‘genders’ (glips and ploks, defined 
by the orientation of the protruding parts: upward or downward,) and five ‘families’, (Samar, Osmit, Galli, Radok, 
and Tasio, defined by the shape of the central part). The presence of this inter-exemplar structure makes them 
an ideal proxy for faces in studies of appearance-trait learning.
In five experiments, we examine whether participants can learn that some Greebles are more trustworthy 
and competent than others. These attributes were chosen because research suggests that trait perception is 
structured along these two dimensions 45,46. In all experiments, we measure whether adult participants exhibit 
learning about individual Greebles that generalises to novel Greebles of similar appearance. In the crucial fourth 
and fifth experiments, we measure whether first impressions acquired through learning take on qualities previ-
ously assumed to apply specifically to mappings based on innate architecture. That is, we measure whether first 
impressions acquired through training occur rapidly (following 100 ms presentation).
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All experiments were carried out in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical approval for all experiments was received from the research ethics committee of 
the Department of Psychology, University of York, protocol number 820. Data for all experiments are available 
in the OSF repository at https:// osf. io/ ub6th/? view_ only= 72831 b5399 55436 59182 f6db6 f2542 3147.
Experiment 1
Method. Experimental overview. Participants first completed a training procedure in which they encoun-
tered Greebles from two families. The Greebles from one family acted in a way that was consistently trustworthy. 
The Greebles from the second family acted in a way that was consistently untrustworthy. In a subsequent test, we 
measured whether participants learned about the apparent trustworthiness of the Greebles from this procedure, 
and whether they generalized any learning to novel but similar looking Greebles from the same family. Our 
preregistered inclusion criteria and analysis plans for this and all subsequent experiments are available at https:// 
osf. io/ ub6th/? view_ only= 72831 b5399 55436 59182 f6db6 f2542 3147. This experiment, and all subsequent experi-
ments save for Experiments 4 and 5, were presented using Qualtrics  software48.
Participants. Forty participants (Mage = 32.93  years, SDage = 11.19  years, range: 18–60  years, 11 males) were 
recruited through www. proli fic. co. All participants in this and all subsequent experiments indicated that they 
were primarily resident in the UK. Participants each received a small honorarium for taking part. In order to 
participate, participants had to be aged 18 years old or more, speak English as a native language, and reside in the 
UK at the time of testing. We planned to exclude participants whose task completion time was more than three 
standard deviations below the mean. However, no participants met this criterion. No participants in the current 
study completed more than one experiment.
Sample size was determined a priori by a power analysis conducted using MorePower 6.0.449. Power and 
alpha were set at the conventional levels of 0.8 and 0.05 respectively. Pilot data yielded a large effect size (partial 
eta-squared of 0.38) for the effects of interest. The analysis indicated that a sample size of 40 ensured adequate 
power for a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA.
Contextualization. The experiment began with a brief introduction designed to demonstrate that Greebles 
are intentional agents, and thus could plausibly participate in the kinds of actions that participants would hear 
about during the training trials. Four pictures were individually presented, each showing a different Greeble on 
a background portraying an outdoor scene. Each picture was accompanied by a text describing an action that 
demonstrated neither trustworthiness nor competence (e.g., ‘Here is a Greeble going for a walk’). The Greebles 
presented during the introduction were from different families to those used in the experiment. Note that at no 
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Training procedure. Participants completed 72 training trials. Each training trial depicted a male Greeble from 
Family-1 and a male Greeble from Family-2 (Fig. 1a). The two Greebles were presented side-by-side below a text 
description of an action and its consequence (Fig. 1b).
On half (36) of the trials, actions were positively valenced on the dimension of trustworthiness. The remain-
ing 36 trials presented actions that were negatively valenced on the dimension of trustworthiness. Trustworthy 
actions involved sharing behaviors (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles shared some nuts with another Greeble so 
that the other Greeble wouldn’t be hungry’), helping behaviors (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles went up a ladder 
for another Greeble because the other Greeble was scared of heights’), and caring behaviors (e.g., ‘One of these 
two Greebles read a story to another Greeble and the other Greeble really enjoyed it’).
The remaining 36 trials presented actions that were negatively valenced on the dimension of trustworthiness. 
Untrustworthy actions involved either refusing to engage in helping, sharing, or caring behavior (e.g., ‘One of 
these two Greebles refused to share a shelter with another Greeble and let the other Greeble get wet’), or behav-
iors that were antithetical to sharing, helping, or caring (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles threw eggs at another 
Greeble and made the other Greeble upset’).
On each trial, participants were asked to choose which Greeble they thought had performed the action. 
When participants clicked on their chosen Greeble, the background to that picture was illuminated (Fig. 1b). If 
participants chose correctly, then they saw a further picture informing them that their choice was correct (‘Yes! 
This Greeble [past action description]’. If they chose incorrectly, they saw the second picture (‘No! This Greeble 
[past action description]’). Regardless of whether a participant answered correctly or incorrectly, a green tick 
was displayed over the correct Greeble and a red cross over the incorrect Greeble.
Figure 1.  (a) The familiar and novel Greebles used in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. (b) Example display from a 
training trial. (c) Example display from a test trial. (d) Results from Experiment 1. (e) Results from Experiment 
2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, 
Carnegie Mellon University, http:// www. tarrl ab. org/.
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For half of participants, Family-1 was associated with trustworthy actions and Family-2 was associated with 
untrustworthy actions. For the other half of participants, this mapping was reversed. Events were presented in 
one of two random orders. Half of participants viewed events in one order, and half in the other. For each type 
of behavior (sharing, helping, and caring), the relative position of the Greebles from Family-1 and Family-2 was 
counterbalanced.
Test procedure. Following training, participants completed a test procedure (Fig. 1c). Each of the 12 test trials 
presented a single Greeble centrally. Participants rated how nice the Greeble was on a sliding scale ranging from 
‘Not at all’ (representing − 50) to ‘Extremely’ (representing + 50). ‘Nice’ was defined for participants before they 
began the test trials: ‘Nice means socially warm and pleasant.’
Participants rated the six Greebles on which they had been trained (henceforth ‘familiar’ Greebles) and six 
Greebles (3 from each trained family) that they had not yet encountered (henceforth ‘novel’ Greebles). The 12 
test trials were presented in a different random order for each participant. For each participant, we computed 
four average ratings: trustworthy family (familiar Greebles), trustworthy family (novel Greebles), untrustworthy 
family (familiar Greebles), untrustworthy family (novel Greebles).
Results. The average trust ratings (Fig. 1d) were analysed using ANOVA with Trustworthiness (trustworthy, 
untrustworthy Greebles) and Trial Type (familiar, novel) as within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed a main 
effect of Trustworthiness [F(1,39) = 89.45, p < .001, η2 = 0.70] indicating that participants learned about the rela-
tive trustworthiness of the Greebles from the training. The analysis yielded no effect of Trial Type [F(1,39) = 0.27, 
p = .630, η2 = 0.01]. There was a marginal interaction between trustworthiness and Trial Type [F(1,39) = 4.08, 
p = .050, η2 = 0.10]. However, ratings for familiar and novel Greebles did not differ significantly for trustworthy 
[t(39) = 1.81, p = .077, d = 0.29] or untrustworthy Greebles [t(39) = 1.33, p = .191, d = 0.21]. These results indicate 
that participants quickly learnt about the character traits of Greebles. This learning generalised to novel Greebles 
with little or no decrement.
In further exploratory analyses, we sought to ensure that there was a significant difference for both the familiar 
and novel trials when considered independently. In order to assess this, we ran two paired samples t-tests. These 
tests demonstrated that there was a significant difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles both 
when they were familiar to participants (t(39) = 9.15, p < .001, d = 1.45) and when they were novel (t(39) = 8.21, 
p < .001, d = 1.30).
Experiment 2
Method. Experimental overview. In our first experiment, we found that participants were able to learn 
a relationship between Greeble appearance cues and a character trait (trustworthiness). In Experiment 2, we 
sought to determine whether this mapping can be acquired with even less experience, using half the number of 
training trials.
Participants. Forty participants were recruited through www. proli fic. co (Mage = 35.38 years, SDage = 10.76 years, 
range: 20–68 years, 12 males). The inclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 1. No participants were 
removed from the analyses. Participants each received a small honorarium.
Training and test procedure. The design, materials, procedure and data scoring were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. The only difference was that there were 36 rather than 72 training trials.
Results. The average trust ratings (Fig. 1e) were analysed using ANOVA with Trustworthiness (trustwor-
thy, untrustworthy Greebles) and Trial Type (familiar, novel) as within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed 
a main effect of Trustworthiness [F(1,39) = 62.77, p < .001, η2 = 0.62] indicating that participants learned about 
the relative trustworthiness of the Greebles from the training. However, the analysis yielded no effect of Trial 
Type [F(1,39) = 0.98, p = .328, η2 = 0.03] and no Trustworthiness × Trial Type interaction [F(1,39) = 1.33, p = .257, 
η2 = 0.03]. Despite the abbreviated training procedure, participants learned the appearance-trustworthiness 
mapping and applied it to novel exemplars without decrement.
In further exploratory analyses, we sought to ensure that there was a significant difference for both the 
familiar and novel trials when considered independently. Two paired-samples t-tests demonstrated that there 
was a significant difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles both when they were familiar to 
participants (t(39) = 7.93, p < .001, d = 1.25) and when they were novel (t(39) = 7.36, p < .001, d = 1.16).
Experiment 3
Method. Experimental overview. In our next experiment, we examined whether we could replicate these 
findings when participants were asked to learn more complex patterns of appearance-trait mappings. We took 
advantage of the fact that Greebles have both families and genders. Importantly, different appearance cues de-
fine family membership (shape of central part) and gender membership (orientation of protruding parts). For 
example, a male Greeble from Family-1 might closely resemble another male Greeble from Family-1, and bear 
little resemblance to a female Greeble from Family-2. However, a male Greeble from Family-1 would share some 
appearance cues with a female Greeble from Family-1 and share other appearance cues with a male Greeble from 
Family-2.
We examined whether participants could learn that one set of appearance cues (e.g., gender features) were 
predictive of competence, and another set of cues (e.g., family features) were predictive of trustworthiness. 
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The structure of this task more closely mirrors the nature of appearance-trait covariation in the real  world46: 
prominent models of social perception argue that individuals can vary independently in trustworthiness and 
 competence50.
Participants. One hundred and twenty-eight participants were recruited through www. proli fic. co 
(Mage = 37.40 years, SDage = 14.1 years, range: 18–82 years, 49 males). Our preregistered data collection and anal-
ysis plan specified 126 participants, based on power analysis. However, to achieve an equal number of partici-
pants in each counterbalancing condition we required 128 participants. We therefore collected an additional two 
participants. The inclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 1. No participants were removed from the 
analyses. Participants each received a small honorarium. Power analysis conducted a priori with MorePower 
6.0.449 with power and alpha at the conventional levels of 0.8 and 0.05 respectively indicated that a sample of 126 
was needed to provide power of 0.8 for a for a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA, assuming an effect size of 0.06.
Training procedure. Participants completed 72 training trials, during which they encountered 12 Greebles 
(Fig. 2). Three were males from Family-1, three were females from Family-1, three were males from Family-2, 
and three were females from Family-2. As before, each training trial presented two Greebles side-by-side below 
an event description. In half (36) of these events the protagonists engaged in behaviours demonstrating high or 
low trustworthiness, and in the other 36 events they demonstrated high or low competence.
The events described during trustworthiness training trials were identical to those used in Experiment 2. 
During competence training trials, competent actions demonstrated intelligence (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles 
got some difficult sums right and worked out how much money was left for the week’), innovation (e.g., ‘One of 
these two Greebles designed a new kind of aeroplane that could fly further than ever before’), and knowledge 
(e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles learned all about rare birds and then spotted one in the woods’). Incompetent 
actions involved behaviors demonstrating lack of intelligence (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles read a map upside 
down and got lost’), failures of innovation, (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles made mistakes in building a rocket 
and it crashed into a tree’), or lack of knowledge (e.g., ‘One of these two Greebles couldn’t learn to ride a canoe 
and fell into the river’).
Participants were randomly allocated to one of eight counterbalancing conditions (Table 1). For 50% of par-
ticipants, gender cues predicted the trustworthiness of the Greebles and family cues predicted their competence. 
For the remaining participants, family cues predicted the trustworthiness of the Greebles and gender cues pre-
dicted their competence. Events were presented in one of two random orders. Since each Greeble belonged both 
to a particular family and to a particular gender, Greebles were presented as varying in both trustworthiness and 
competence. Within each set of 36 trustworthiness-related events and each set of 36 competence-related events, 
each of the 12 individual target Greebles was presented three times to each participant. The second Greeble was 
always matched to the target Greeble on the valence of the trait irrelevant to the event. That is, where an event 
concerned trustworthiness, either both Greebles presented as competent, or both as incompetent.
Figure 2.  The 24 Greebles used in Experiments 3 and 5 included exemplars from two genders and two families. 
Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Carnegie Mellon University, http:// www. tarrl ab. org/.
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Test procedure. Each test trial presented a single Greeble. Participants were asked to rate the Greeble shown 
for both trustworthiness and competence using a sliding scale. The order of presentation of the trustworthiness 
scale and competence scale was counterbalanced, such that half of participants saw the trustworthiness ques-
tion above the competence question, and half saw the competence question above the trustworthiness question. 
Twelve test trials presented the familiar Greebles that had been encountered during training. Twelve test trials 
presented novel Greebles that had not been seen before (Fig. 2). Three were males from Family-1, three were 
females from Family-1, three were males from Family-2, and three were females from Family-2. The 24 test trials 
were presented in a different random order for each participant.
Results. For each participant, we computed eight average trust and eight average competence ratings from 
the three factors of: trustworthiness (high/low) × competence (high/low) × type (novel/familiar). Following our 
pre-registered plan, two repeated measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted separately on the 
dependent variables of trustworthiness and competence ratings. In each ANOVA, Trustworthiness (trustworthy, 
untrustworthy), Competence (competent, incompetent), and Trial Type (familiar, novel Greebles) were within-
subjects factors.
Trustworthiness ratings (Fig. 3a): The analysis revealed a main effect of Trustworthiness, such that trustworthy 
Greebles were rated as more trustworthy than untrustworthy Greebles [F(1,127) = 68.48, p < .001, η2 = 0.35] and 
a main effect of competence, such that competent Greebles were also rated as more trustworthy than incompe-
tent Greebles [F(1,127) = 13.15, p < .001, η2 = 0.09]. There was also a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,127) = 11.58, 
p < .001, η2 = 0.08], such that familiar Greebles were rated as more trustworthy than novel Greebles. No significant 
interactions were observed (all F’s < 0.1, all p’s > .32).
We further ran exploratory paired samples t-tests in order to ensure that when familiar and novel trials were 
considered independently, significant differences remained in trust ratings. There was a significant difference 
in trust ratings between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles both when they were familiar to participants 
(t(127) = 8.31, p < .001, d = 0.73) and when they were novel (t(127) = 7.91, p < .001, d = 0.70). There was also a sig-
nificant difference in trust ratings between competent and incompetent Greebles that were familiar (t(127) = 3.36, 
p = .001, d = 0.30) and those that were novel (t(127) = 3.35, p = .001, d = 0.30) to participants.
Competence ratings (Fig. 3b): The analysis revealed a main effect of Trustworthiness, such that trustworthy 
Greebles were rated as more competent than untrustworthy Greebles [F(1,127) = 8.62, p < .005, η2 = 0.06] and a 
main effect of competence, such that competent Greebles were also rated as more competent than incompetent 
Greebles [F(1,127) = 89.52, p < .001, η2 = 0.41]. There was no main effect of Trial Type [F(1,127) = 1.97, p = .152, 
η2 = 0.02]. No significant interactions were observed (all F’s < 2.67, all p’s > .105).
We again ran paired samples t-tests in order to ensure that when familiar and novel trials were considered 
independently, significant differences remained in competence ratings. There was a significant difference in 
competence ratings between competent and incompetent Greebles both when they were familiar to participants 
(t(127) = 9.65, p < .001, d = 0.85) and when they were novel (t(127) = 8.57, p < .001, d = 0.76). There was also a 
significant difference in competence ratings between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles that were famil-
iar to participants (t(127) = 3.04, p = .003, d = 0.27) and those that were novel (t(127) = 2.54, p = .012, d = 0.22).
Experiment 3 demonstrates that people are able to quickly learn more complex appearance-trait mappings, 
and that they generalize this learning to novel individuals who resemble trained exemplars.
Experiment 4
Method. Experimental overview. In our next experiment, we examine whether first impressions acquired 
through learning become available even after rapid presentation. Nativist accounts have previously gained sup-
port from evidence suggesting that observers form consistent first impressions of apparent trustworthiness even 
when faces are presented for as little as 100  milliseconds3,13,51,52. In this experiment, we test whether evidence for 
rapid availability is equally compatible with a learning-based account. We measure whether learned associations 
lead to rapid first impressions by restricting viewing time at test to 100 ms. The experiment was presented using 
Gorilla software (gorilla.sc)53,54.
Participants. Forty participants were recruited through www. proli fic. co (Mage = 33.9 years, SDage = 12.12 years, 
range: 19–59 years, 16 males). The inclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 1. No participants were 
removed from the analyses. Participants each received a small honorarium.
Table 1.  The eight appearance-trait mappings trained in Experiment 3. C+ and C− denote high and low 
competence. T+ and T− denote high and low trustworthiness.
Counterbalancing condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Gender-m C+ C− C− C+ T+ T− T+ T−
Gender-f C− C+ C+ C− T− T+ T− T+
Family-1 T+ T− T+ T− C+ C− C− C+
Family-2 T− T+ T− T+ C− C+ C+ C−
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Training and test procedure. Design, materials, and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 2, 
save that test trials were presented for only 100 ms rather than self-paced. Following previous research on first 
impressions and in other areas of cognitive psychology, we employed a binocular noise  mask35,55,56.
Participants were told that they would only see each Greeble for a very brief moment at test. At the outset of 
each test trial, participants viewed a fixation cross at the centre of the screen for 500 ms followed by 500 ms of 
blank screen. A Greeble then appeared for 100 ms and was then covered by a noise mask for 500 ms (Fig. 4), fol-
lowed by a blank screen for 1000 ms. Participants then gave their ratings. The square mask had sides of ~ 147 mm.
Results. The average trustworthiness ratings (Fig.  5) were analysed using ANOVA with Trustworthiness 
(trustworthy, untrustworthy) and Trial Type (familiar, novel) as within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed 
a main effect of Trustworthiness [F(1,39) = 29.87, p < .001 ., η2 = 0.43] indicating that participants learned about 
the relative trustworthiness of the Greebles from the training. The analysis yielded no effect of Trial Type 
[F(1,39) = 0.66, p = .423, η2 = 0.02] and no Trustworthiness × Trial Type interaction [F(1,39) = 0.63, p = .434, 
η2 = 0.02]. Thus, participants formed first impressions of the Greebles presented at test regardless of whether 
exemplars were familiar or novel. These first impressions emerged even though presentation time was extremely 
brief (100 ms).
In further exploratory analyses, we ran two paired samples t-tests in order to ensure that there was a sig-
nificant difference for both the familiar and novel trials when considered independently. There was a signifi-
cant difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles both when they were familiar to participants 
(t(39) = 5.87, p < .001, d = 0.93) and when they were novel (t(39) = 4.24, p < .001, d = 0.67).
Figure 3.  (a) Results from Experiment 3, judgements of trustworthiness. (b) Results from Experiment 3, 
judgements of competence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
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Experiment 5
Method. Experimental overview. In our final experiment, we further test whether evidence for rapid avail-
ability is compatible with a learning-based account. As in Experiment 4, we measure whether learned associa-
tions lead to rapidly available first impressions by restricting viewing time at test to 100 ms. In this experiment, 
however, we ask participants to learn a more complex two-dimensional structure in which Greebles vary in both 
warmth and competence. The experimental design is thus extremely similar to Experiment 3 with the exception 
that viewing time at test is restricted to 100 ms.
Participants. 128 participants were recruited through www. proli fic. co (Mage = 34.71, SDage = 12.85 years, range: 
18–64 years, 45 males; three participants preferred to self-describe their gender). The inclusion criteria were the 
same as for Experiment 1. No participants were removed from the analyses. Participants each received a small 
honorarium.
Training and test procedure. Design, materials, and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 3, 
save for three differences. First, test trials were presented for only 100 ms. Second, to facilitate this rapid presen-
tation, the experiment was presented using the Gorilla Experiment Builder (www. goril la. sc)53,54. Third, events 
during the training phase were presented in a different random order for each participant rather than being 
presented in one of two random orders.
Figure 4.  Trial structure in Experiment 4. Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Carnegie Mellon 
University, http:// www. tarrl ab. org/.
Figure 5.  Results from Experiment 4. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
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Results. As in Experiment 3, we computed eight average trust and eight average competence ratings from 
the three factors of: trustworthiness (high/low) × competence (high/low) × type (novel/familiar) for each partici-
pant. Following our pre-registered plan, we conducted two repeated measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) 
separately on the dependent variables of trustworthiness ratings (Fig. 6a) and competence ratings (Fig. 6b). In 
each ANOVA, Trustworthiness (trustworthy, untrustworthy), Competence (competent, incompetent), and Trial 
Type (familiar, novel Greebles) were within-subjects factors.
Trustworthiness ratings (Fig. 3a): The analysis revealed a main effect of trustworthiness, such that trustworthy 
Greebles were rated as more trustworthy than untrustworthy Greebles [F(1,127) = 54.50, p < .001, η2 = 0.32] and a 
main effect of competence, such that competent Greebles were also rated as more trustworthy than incompetent 
Greebles [F(1,127) = 14.72, p < .001, η2 = 0.10]. There was also a main effect of Trial Type [F(1,127) = 4.49, p = .036, 
η2 = 0.03], such that familiar Greebles were rated as more trustworthy than novel Greebles. No significant interac-
tions were observed (all F’s < 1.4, all p’s > .244).
We further ran paired samples t-tests in order to ensure that when familiar and novel trials were considered 
independently, significant differences remained in warmth ratings. There was a significant difference in trust rat-
ings between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles both when they were familiar to participants (t(127) = 7.39, 
p < .001, d = 0.65) and when they were novel (t(127) = 7.40, p < .001, d = 0.66). There was also a significant differ-
ence in trust ratings between competent and incompetent Greebles that were familiar (t(127) = 3.25, p = .001, 
d = 0.29) and novel (t(127) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 0.34) to participants.
Competence ratings (Fig. 3b): The analysis revealed a main effect of trustworthiness, such that trustworthy 
Greebles were rated as more competent than untrustworthy Greebles [F(1,127) = 20.76, p < .001, η2 = 0.14] and a 
Figure 6.  (a) Results from Experiment 5, judgements of trustworthiness. (b) Results from Experiment 5, 
judgements of competence. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
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main effect of competence, such that competent Greebles were also rated as more competent than incompetent 
Greebles [F(1,127) = 35.78, p < .001, η2 = 0.22]. There was no main effect of Trial Type [F(1,127) = 2.19, p = .141, 
η2 = 0.02]. No significant interactions were observed (all F’s < 0.85, all p’s > .36).
We again ran paired samples t-tests in order to ensure that when familiar and novel trials were considered 
independently, significant differences remained in competence ratings. There was a significant difference in 
competence ratings between competent and incompetent Greebles both when they were familiar to participants 
(t(127) = 5.81, p < .001, d = 0.51) and when they were novel (t(127) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.51). There was also a 
significant difference in competence ratings between trustworthy and untrustworthy Greebles that were famil-
iar to participants (t(127) = 4.52, p = .001, d = 0.40) and when they were novel (t(127) = 3.89, p = .001, d = 0.34).
General discussion
We sought to investigate the plausibility of a learning model of first impressions. Whereas some theoretical 
accounts argue that all first impressions are  learned16,17,27, others maintain that at least some of the first impres-
sions that we form from appearance are the product of gene-based natural  selection12–15. Taken together, our 
studies suggest that learning models have more explanatory power than has thus far been appreciated.
First, we demonstrated that participants can quickly learn to associate the visual features of Greebles with 
trustworthiness and competence. In our first two experiments, participants were able to learn simple mappings 
between one type of cue (Family features) and a particular trait (trustworthiness). In Experiment 3, participants 
also acquired more complex relationships between multiple cues (family and gender features) and multiple traits 
(trustworthiness and competence). In all experiments, participants generalized their learning about individual 
Greebles to novel Greebles of similar appearance with little or no decrement. The attribution of character traits 
to unfamiliar Greebles based on previous appearance-trait experience appears to mirror closely the learning 
processes involved in spontaneous first impressions from faces.
In our fourth and fifth experiments, we showed that first impressions acquired through learning take on 
qualities previously assumed to apply specifically to mappings based on innate architecture. That is, participants 
formed first impressions of greebles in our paradigm even when viewing time was restricted to 100 ms. This 
accords with recent findings showing that first impressions formed from cultural cues such as glasses occur 
 rapidly35. Taken together, these data demonstrate that findings previously thought to support nativist accounts 
of the origins of first impressions are equally compatible with learning accounts.
Thus, these results provide further support for a learning account of first impressions from  faces16,17,27,35. The 
training procedure we used resembles the systematic messages that children receive about the appearance of good 
guys and bad guys, leaders and follows, jocks and geeks on TV, and in films, comics, and books. In light of our 
findings, it seems highly likely that this kind of correlated face-trait experience yields equivalent learning about 
faces, with predictable behavioral consequences. Importantly, this kind of experience would produce similar 
patterns of first impressions within a culture—consensus impressions.
It has been argued that learning models predict very slow emergence of first impressions over a period 
of several  years57. The fact that relatively young children (3- to 4-year-olds) make inferences about the traits 
of strangers based solely on appearance cues may therefore suggest the presence of innate appearance-trait 
 mappings37. However, our results show that appearance-trait mappings can be acquired extremely quickly, and 
that they readily generalize to novel exemplars. While we cannot rule out the existence of innate mappings 
between appearance and character judgments, our findings confirm that face-trait mappings can be acquired in 
the absence of protracted social experience. This view accords with recent accounts emphasizing the importance 
of cultural learning for cognitive development more  generally58.
It is striking that participants generalize learning about individual Greebles to novel Greebles of similar 
appearance with virtually no decrement. Evidently, generalization does not require extensive visual experience 
with a particular stimulus category; indeed, a lack of perceptual expertise might encourage generalization. Future 
work may wish to examine how the generalization of appearance-trait rules varies as a function of participants’ 
expertise with Greebles. This discussion also raises interesting possibilities for future research using faces as 
stimuli. For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether young children, who have less perceptual 
expertise with faces than do adults, are more likely to generalize trait profiles to novel individuals based on 
experience with a few limited exemplars. It would also be interesting to investigate whether adults are more 
likely to generalize trait profiles from faces with which they have less perceptual expertise, for example those 
from different ethnicities.
In our paradigm, participants were never told about the different Greeble families and Greeble genders. Thus, 
it appears that the generalization of learning was down to participants’ ability to detect patterns of similar visual 
features and extrapolate newly acquired feature-trait rules. However, developmental research makes clear that 
parents mark some social categories as important in conversation with their  children59,60. It would be interest-
ing to use the paradigm developed here to test how cultural tendencies to label social groups and mark them as 
meaningful affects the acquisition of appearance-trait rules.
It is interesting to consider whether similar results would also appear in other cultural contexts. One particu-
larly promising avenue for future research would be to assess whether these results replicate in interdependent 
cultures. Previous research has suggested that individuals from interdependent cultures rely less on trait infer-
ences than do individuals from independent cultures, and tend to make trait inferences more  slowly61,62. It is 
possible, therefore, that the acquisition of first impressions would differ in interdependent cultures.
Our studies suggest that learning models provide a plausible explanation for the origins of all first impressions 
of character traits from appearance. It has long been known that people attribute character traits to strangers 
based solely on their appearance. However, the mechanisms responsible are only now becoming apparent. By 
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understanding the learning processes responsible, cognitive science can inform interventions to reduce the 
influence of these appearance-trait stereotypes.
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